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Abstract 
This paper examined the association between farm household varying objectives (commercial 
or subsistence orientation) and own investment expenditures (enterprising tendency) 
interdependence in explaining the implications for Collective Action (CA) coordination in the 
common. Cross sectional research design was employed to collect data from a total of 184 
randomly sampled farm households involved in rice irrigation farming in the selected seven 
irrigation schemes located in  five districts of  Ngudu, Misungwi, Shinyanga rural, Bunda and 
Rorya within  the Lake Victoria basin.  Collected data were analysed using 2SLS regression 
analysis to establish factors determining enterprising tendency, a proxy for coordination 
incentive. Results indicated that farm household objectives; particularly commercial/market 
oriented production was an important incentive for coordination. This variable must be hand 
in hand with other exogenous variables designated as “excluded instruments” for greater 
impact, which positively and significantly supported market oriented production. Other 
variables like trust, contact cost/communication and experience were important determinant 
of enterprising tendency (incentives/ disincentive) in the Tanzanian irrigation systems CA 
coordination. The study recommends strengthening of advisory services in the irrigation 
schemes, particularly capacity building with regard to business development services (BDS) 
for commercial oriented production, and a comprehensive CA management training tailored 
particularly, into building trust among member farmers, which positively influenced 
enterprising tendency. Improvement of group leadership management training- which was a 
disincentive for investment in the irrigation, and so do CA coordination is crucial.   
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In most developing countries worldwide, the policy for the management of natural resources 
such as forestry, rangelands, protected areas, and water particularly, irrigation systems and 
water sheds have been decentralized in a varying degree such that the communities 
themselves have to manage such resources ( Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Meinzen-Dick, 
2004; Araral, 2008). This policy shift is a response towards among other factors, greater 
awareness of the governments in regard to incentive problems amongst these resources 
management.  In Tanzania, smallholder irrigation systems are either traditional improved or 
modern schemes managed by the community. The institutional arrangement for irrigation 
water resource management and utilization is such that the community organize themselves 
into groups of irrigators/ water users association (WUA) in accordance with the rights and 
eligibility of member irrigation farming participation. The irrigation farming participation 
rights are defined by their institution in collective action (CA) and government common 
resources management guidelines and policy. In order to access irrigation water such groups 
(irrigators) are granted ownership in form of common water right permit (NIPO, 2009). This 
institutional arrangement had the expectation that would enhance ownership through property 
rights and hence efficient organization for greater impact of the irrigation systems 
performance.  
 
However, the situation has not been the case as expected because the irrigation systems 
performance is still hopeless. The existing awkward situation is  such that frequent entry and 
exit of farmers, and smaller cultivated land area compared with their holdings  coupled by 
land abandonment in various irrigation schemes persist (NIPO, 2009; SUA, 2010; Msuya and 
Isinika, 2011; MAFC, 2011), notwithstanding the huge investment directed towards 
infrastructure (irrigation hardware) development.  Until now, the policies in Tanzania have 
not paid sufficient attention on the institutions and mechanisms of organizational aspects 
related to coordination efficiency of collective action (CA), which is a soft ware in irrigation 
systems performance.  As a result, the irrigation systems perform poorly, (Water sector, 
2009; You et al., 2010; NAPO, 2013).  A number of factors have been pointed out to 
contribute to the problem of inefficiency performance of the irrigation systems. They include 
among other factors, poor water management and control (WMC), inefficient extension 
services (NIPO, 2009; SUA, 2010), and farmers’ disregard of by-laws (Rajabu and Mahoo, 
2008). Practically, these underlying contributing factors described above are a manifestation 
of lack of collective action (CA) amongst farmers.  Particularly, scholars have explained CA 
variations on natural resources management across the world by groups or sociability 
identification, environmental (ecology) and technology congruency, and economic factors on 
their own right (Wade, 1987; Ostrom, 2002).   
 
Other scholars,  Meinze-Dick, (2000), Araral , ( 2008),  and Ostrom, (2002,2010), have 
identified factors such as group size, physical characteristics of the common resource, and 
characteristics of resource users such as age, poverty incidence, and salience of resource to 
the livelihoods of the users  as  factors influencing collective action successfulness. However, 
all together these studies have ignored other individual household incentives related to  
entrepreneurial activities (entrepreneurship) and the embeddedness of such factors like 
transaction costs (contact, contract and control), and  unobserved characteristics like 
preferences,  which  can condition farmers’ decisions to foster or deter CA (irrigation 
software) successfulness (Dercon et al. 2012; Araral, 2013).  
 
African Journal of Economic Review, Volume V, Issue I, January 2017 
112 
 
In the main stream economic theory, entrepreneurship is viewed as judgemental decision 
under uncertainty over deployment of assets and innovation aspects (Jos and Bart, 2008; 
Klein, 2009). Entrepreneurs are the founders, the owners and the managers of the firm all 
rolled into one and are responsible for organising the other factors of production so that the 
firm- in this case an irrigation system, can produce a good or services (Earl and Wakeley, 
2005).  Clearly, uncertainty in water management and control (WMC) is an important 
characteristic of the irrigation systems management challenge (NIPO, 2009; SUA, 2010), 
hence farm household decisions based on farming objectives  as an entrepreneur on own 
expenditures (investment),  and utilization of the productive resources can foster or deter CA 
successfulness in the common.   
 
In essence, individuals choose to become entrepreneur based on personal rewards offered by 
opportunities and their capabilities.  Extensive bodies of literature exist to throw lights on the 
factors which influence entrepreneurship.   Holtz-Eakin et al., (1993) have shown that the 
size of an inheritance (wealth from parents) affect the likelihood of an individual (consumer) 
becoming an entrepreneur and the amount of capital employed/invested. Further, they 
indicated  that other  factors such as knowledge of production, technologies and ownership of 
property rights, such as patents rights or common  water right permit in case of irrigation 
systems, education, training, experience, in additional to access to information about market 
opportunities, abilities and  business judgment orientation are also likely to  influence  the 
decision to become entrepreneur. Scholars, e.g.  Katundu and Gabagambi (2014) using binary 
logistic regression model have also reported that factors like entrepreneurship education, 
parents’ education are some of factors likely to influence entrepreneurial tendency among 
University graduates.  However, all these studies have not integrated the transaction cost 
(TC) in the entrepreneurial aspects, which is intertwined in the entrepreneurial activities, and 
there is a consensus that TCs shape the process of entrepreneurship discovery (Foss and Foss, 
2006). 
 
Consistently, TC analysis can be applied to issues of irrigation systems management to 
understand the institutional and coordination efficiency, where collective action (CA) is 
considered as an institutional tool or software that translates into efficient performance of the 
irrigation systems. According to Williamson, (2005) transaction cost economics concentrates 
on the relative efficiency of different exchange processes. In irrigation systems, transaction 
costs could be defined as the costs of acquiring and handling the information about the 
mobilization of voluntary cooperation on irrigation infrastructure operation and maintenance 
(O&M), water allocation and distribution, water management and control, contributions of 
relevant costs and contracts compliances, resource users’ reputation adherence  (respect of 
laws and regulations) on interactions, and so on.  On the other hand, next to the economic 
objectives, which can condition farmers to foster or deter CA coordination is the household 
farm objectives expressed in preferences of their plans of action.  For example, Jacoby et al. 
(2014) studying evaluation of rangeland management contend that management decisions are 
usually influenced by farmers’ objectives, apart from interrelation of ecological, economic 
and social factors. Together, these studies are useful and have provided insights on 
coordination and management of resources by resource users (farmers) as a starting point for 
this research.   
  
Along these lines, this paper extends beyond the above factors to identify some of not 
previously identified variables that influence collective action coordination in the irrigation 
systems in the context of farm household objectives and enterprising tendency 
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interdependency (reverse causation) using instrumental variable strategy, notable, the two 
stage least square (2SLS) to establish the causation.  The work contributes to the existing 
literature by extending the 2SLS analysis approach to farm household objectives as relevant 
factors in explaining the decision to enterprising tendency in the common, with the view to 
understanding CA coordination incentives.  Most studies investigating enterprising tendency 
(Katundu and Gabagambi, 2014), and the effect of farmers’ objectives on economic 
phenomenon have assumed exogeneity relations in variables (Kallas et al., 2009; Jcoby et al., 
2014), which is usually not the case.  
 
Specifically, this very study thoroughly explored how varying farm objectives affect the 
extent of entrepreneurship (private specific investment decisions) of a household in a CA 
setting in irrigation systems, and introduced transaction cost variables like information 
search/contact cost, and group characteristics in terms of governance related variables such as 
group leadership style/discretion, which have not been investigated before in an integral way 
in irrigation systems research. The paper tested the hypothesis that  “household own 
investment (specific private own expenditures) decision in irrigation farming does not depend 
on farming objectives because irrigation is important for resource users in  enhancing  food 
and income regardless of the enterprising orientation the farmer took’’.  It take the conception 
that jointly owned firm (-a common resource characterized by the rivalry of consumption and 
difficulty of exclusion) where entrepreneurial activities take place at different levels of 
organization: collectively and individual independent member. The collective organization 
pattern involves cooperative entrepreneurship such that the activities of the jointly owned 
aspects such as collective efforts like operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure or 
contributions, and those of individual owned are interdependent (Jos and Bart, 2008).  
 
To this end, this paper concentrates on individual farm household incentives to enterprising 
tendency in the common (common resource pool), where the deployment of own assets takes 
place in an uncertainty conditions particularly, with regard to water management and control 
(NIPO, 2009), and disregard of bylaws (Rajabu and Mahoo, 2008).  Understanding the 
investment enterprising decisions for smallholder farmers- at an individual independent 
entrepreneur is important for critical success of CA working in the irrigation systems, 
because the performance of individual farm household entrepreneur crucially depend on the  
collective organization environment in that common resource (Jos and Bart, 2008)).  Foss et 
al. (2006) put forward that the significance of the capital asset on the production of good is 
determined by an entrepreneur, as expressed in the willingness to pay for the service of that 
asset. Thus, the level and factors influencing own private investment expenditures under 
uncertainty are important characteristics of the entrepreneurship and reflects CA coordination 
incentives, besides are indicators for performance evaluations in the irrigation systems. 
 
2.0 Conceptual and theoretical framework 
Collective action is related to management success and member patronage, at the same time 
most capital asset expenditures by a farmer in irrigation systems are sunk cost in case not 
used, or if are firm specific that have no alternative use (Aramyan et al. 2007).  Accordingly, 
famers face dilemma in decision making because of uncertainty resulting from water 
management and control variations (NIPO, 2009), and disregard of by laws, which as a result 
create free riding and opportunistic behavior operating environment amongst water resource 
users (Rajabu and Mahoo, 2008).  Alongside, household preference (which is latent and only 
observed by actions) usually determine the differences in livelihood strategies (plans) 
undertaken among resource users. These differences in livelihood strategies (driven by their 
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objectives) are likely to be a result of largely unobserved household characteristics, expressed 
in terms of differences among household endowment and enterprising tendency (choices) 
such as investment judgment, farming orientation, inputs used, off farm activities 
engagement, and valuation and choice of accessible economic activities/opportunities against 
irrigation system through implicit ranking.   Enterprising tendency (entrepreneurship) plays a 
greater role in driving organizational coordination functions of firms (Maharati and Nazemi, 
2012).  
 
In its entirety, entrepreneurship covers a broad spectrum ideas and definitions ranging from 
occupational, innovation, and business creation to organization /coordination point of views 
(Hall and Sobel, 2006; Jos and Bart, 2008; Soriano, 2010). Although, a good body of 
literature on entrepreneurship exist, all together, have concentrated on the role of 
entrepreneurship, but the contribution to the firm coordination has been neglected or else not 
clearly tackled. This paper links entrepreneurship and coordination. Entrepreneurship has 
been defined as a  judgmental decision making over deployment of assets in face of 
uncertainty and bringing  about coordination of the firm- an irrigation system ( Jos and Bart, 
2008; Maharati and Nazemi, 2012). The firm (irrigation system) as an organisation is 
dedicated to the planning of sustainable resource utilization based on information synthesis 
and operating environment by the entrepreneurial founder (resource users), and is effected 
more by its managerial organization embedded in an institution framework of CA.  Thus, The 
CA institution (management) and government guidelines define the property rights for 
entrepreneurs’ resource utilization in the irrigation systems. 
The paper seeks to integrate farm household objectives, transaction costs, and governance 
related factors such as group leadership style to understand enterprising tendency as an 
incentive for coordination of CA. The enterprising tendency  is measured in terms of own 
annual irrigation expenditures committed for irrigation farming, to imply that the price or cost 
(investment) of the resources used by the entrepreneur  reflects the opportunity cost of their 
employment in other uses (Hall and Sobel, 2006). The implication is that the higher the 
capital asset invested the higher the motivation for ensuring firm coordination efficiency in 
order to safeguard losses would be for the investment made.  On the other hand, farm 
household objectives are operationalized in the context of economic motivation hierarchy 
structure as in Kallas et al., (2009), which are measured as dummy values of commercial or 
subsistence farming objectives. Transaction costs and governance related factors are 
measured in their various respective proxies. The framework is thus centered on management 
theory of investment that account for farm and personal characteristics (Aramyan et al. 2007), 
and farm household investment (e.g. Barnum and Squire, 1979) that explains the household 
as both producer and consumer under imperfect markets, and entrepreneurship theory, which 
is built in from firm and transaction cost  economics theories- that portrays an organization- 
embedded in the institution framework of CA management (Casson,1998; Williamson , 
2005). These combined theories provided the basis to investigate the linkages between the 
farm household objectives and decisions on investment enterprising tendency, which is 










The study area 
The study was conducted in the Lake Victoria water basin (LVB) in 2014 covering   seven 
irrigation schemes hosted in each of the five districts named in brackets: Mahiga irrigation 
scheme (Ngudu), Igongwa (Misungwi), Nyida ( Shinyanga rural), Maliwanda and Nyatwali 
(Bunda), and Cheleche and Irienyi (Rorya). These districts have different agro ecological 
system defined by different farming system zonation (FSZ),  characterized by the interactions 
of cultural, agro-biological aspects like dominant soil types, rainfall distribution and socio 
economic factors such as  input-output markets, own farmers priority on crops cultivated and 
resources capabilities. Because of good correlation between local soils, parent materials, 
landforms, historical settlement patterns and current local farming systems,   the Zonation is 
based on  land unit approach, in which soils and physiography played a dominant role (Van 
Kekem, 1999).  
These selected districts have also more or less homogeneous characteristics on other aspects 
related to culture, input-output market characteristics, and crops grown particularly, in the 
irrigation schemes where rice/paddy is the major crops grown. Accordingly, Mahiga, 
Igongwa and Nyida irrigation schemes are traditional improved, whose depend on temporary 
rivers for their water source. Maliwanda, Cheleche, and Irienyi are also traditional improved 
schemes, but with reservoir/ dams constructed to collect rain water during the season. 
Virtually, all these schemes are seasonal operating mainly during rainy season employing 
gravity method for water abstraction from the water source and distribution in the plots/field.  
However, there is an exception of Nyatwali  irrigation scheme because it uses electrical pump 
for water abstraction and the main source of water being Lake Victoria; hence  the only 
scheme that operates all year round in the study area.  
Research design  
The study relied on primary data involving cross sectional design, which drawn individual 
farmers participating in irrigation farming. The collected data comprised of farm households 
and groups characteristics, which covered mainly the governance, transaction costs, 
technology characteristics, and the social capital variables in the form of their various 
proxies.  Farm household was used as a unit of observation for the analysis. To identify the 
causal effect relations, the design compared farmers participating in the irrigation farming by 
creating stratification during analysis: those engaged in irrigation farming perse; and those 
engaged in both irrigation and rain fed in each of the scheme surveyed to identify the factors 
which influence the enterprising tendency in the common. 
 
Sampling procedure and sample size 
The survey employed a multi stage sampling procedure based on two stages approach. First, 
purposive sampling was used to obtain a total of 7 irrigation schemes-both traditional 
improved and modern, which are distributed along water basin of Lake Victoria in the five 
districts described above. The selection criteria for the irrigation schemes were based on the 
potential functional (operational) of the irrigation facilities, and age of the scheme (that is, 
has been working/operational for the past 5-10 years or so) in order to capture the dynamic 
conditions. The second stage involved survey respondents selection, where from each 
scheme, 30 farm households- participants in the irrigation farming, in addition to off farm 
activities engagement were randomly sampled.  In total 7 irrigation schemes and initially 210 
households were thought, however, 184 households (about 87.6% response rate)-those who 
were willing to participate in the interview were reached.  
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Data types and Analysis Method 
Primary data set  collected were constructed to suit addressing the simultaneity bias of 
variables with  an interdependence mechanism, where the independent variable- farming 
objective (commercial or subsistence)/treatment  and  the outcome of interest (dependent 
variable)- investment expenditures proxied as enterprising tendency both are endogenous. 
The data type used for the structural equation dependent variable, investment expenditures ( 
Inv) was indirectly measured as own annual/private  total irrigation expenditures /investment  
made in  the irrigation farming during the cropping period to account for real capital asset use 
(total cost in Tanzania shillings -logged ), that was as a proxy for measuring the extent of  
enterprising tendency.  
The independent variable- farm household objectives (FO), which is also endogenous in the 
structural equation, was measured as a dummy variable- whether the farmer is 
commercial/semi-commercial or subsistence oriented. Exogenous variables were identified 
and constructed  to serve as instruments for 1X  (assumed to influence farmer objectives/ 
orientation, (FO)- these  included output quantity marketed,  proximity/distance to the 
irrigation schemes,  output market distance ( all measured in km), and transaction costs  
mainly contact costs  measured in  monetary value of contact/communication e.g. phone & 
travel costs (Tzs), and number (frequency) of meetings. Other instrumental variable data 
included  were saccos service access ( dummy), farming support services -which included 
extension service support (dummy), soil fertility status in the irrigation scheme (dummy),  off 
farm activities engagement (dummy), household labor force availability (number of eligible 
member for farming), and irrigation type (dummy).  The exogenous variables included in the 
structural equation were, sex (dummy), ownership of land within the irrigation 
scheme(dummy), group leadership style(dummy), non tangible benefits like information 
sharing (categorical), trust (dummy),  experience in irrigation farming (years),  
contact/communication cost (Tanzania shillings/currency). 
Analysis method 
Instrumental variable (IV) strategy was implemented to analyse the collected data for the 
variables with simultaneous characteristics described above. Different estimators such as 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM), Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) 
and Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) exist in estimating IV (Verbeek, 2012). To control for 
the endogeneity problem, this study adopted a 2SLS because has advantage over other 
estimators described above in that it is computationally simple such that does not require the 
use of optimisation algorithms (i.e. can estimate parameters even if cannot be solved 
analytically from the first order conditions). It can also perform better under small sample ( 
Verbeek, 2012), and it is efficient in the class of all IV estimators (Wooldrige, 2010). 
Mathematically, the 2SLS modelling proceeds in the following two steps: First, the 
true/structural equation is specified as: 
ii eXXY  21211110           (1)
 
Where, iY endogenous outcome variable (log of total annual investment cost (Tzs) made in 
irrigation farming during the season  iXX 11 Independent variables which is endogenous- 
farm household objective (FO)- (dummy- 1= commercial or 0= subsistence oriented farmer) 
2X  Independent variables which are exogenous (personal characteristics: age, sex, 
ownership of land in the irrigation scheme, trust, experience, group leadership 
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style/discretion, and non tangible benefits- measured as defined above.  ,21 , Parameters 
to be estimated, and  ie  error term which is assumed to be  correlated with the endogenous 
variable 
Second, some variable(s) Z  (instruments), which influence iX1 , but does not influence iY  are 
found. Correspondingly, the equation follows by including all exogenous variables from 
equation (1) above.  
It is written as: 
iii
eXZX  23231201          (2)
 




1 , such that 




1  can now be substituted for iX1  in equation (1) above for 
estimation. 









iiii ueXXY 112121110 1         (3) 
Equation (3) was estimated using OLS method using STATA version 11 computer statistical 
program. 
4.0 Results and Discussion  
4.1 Farm households’ characteristics for irrigators in the study area 
Many farmers surveyed had primary level of education (73.2%), and 86% were married 
living with their spouse (Table 1).  On average the farm household families comprised of 8 
persons (members) residing and eating on the same pot, and having a mean of 3.9 persons for 
labour force supply available for farming activities, indicating that large number of members 
were dependants; perhaps these were children or old persons who cannot work. However, 
most of these respondents had an average of 2.14 acres land holding within the irrigation 
scheme utilizing the total land or portion of it for irrigation farming depending on the 
cropping seasons’ rainfall conditions, availability of labour and the CA management 
arrangement.  About 88.9% of interviewed household used animal traction in irrigation 
farming for land preparation/tillage, pointing an advancement of technologies use, 
nevertheless, a few respondents owned at least an average of 2 ox ploughs for households 
owning livestock.  
 
More farmers owned livestock in the study area with an average number of 10.8 for cattle, 
7.5 for sheep and goat (shoats), and 16.5 for chicken.  An interesting characteristic of these 
surveyed households is that most farmers interviewed had stayed longer in the village without 
migration or mobility. This has an implication on collective action management, and social 
interactions as a social capital, particularly with regard to membership club formation 
because they know each other (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), and is a pre-condition to CA 
coordination take off.  Social capital is associated with networks and norms aspects that 
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promote trust, which facilitates coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits of 
interactive members. Thus, migration of individuals might have negative impact on social 
capital by interfering trust among members, but also possible to move away the social capital 
with them to new places (Lesage and Ha, 22012).   
 
Table 1: Farm household characteristics  
Variable Mean Percent 
Family size (persons) 8   (184) - 
Household labour force (persons) 3.9 (184) - 
Land holding in the irrigation scheme (acres) 2.14 (161) - 
Cattle ownership (numbers) 10.8 (135) - 
Sheep and goat (number) 7.5  (118) - 
chicken 16.5  (135) - 
Marital status (% living with spouse) - 86.4 (159) 
Formal education level (% primary level) - 73.2 (134) 
Irrigation farming tools used (% ox plough)  - 88.9  (136) 
Irrigation farming tool owned (number of oxplough) 2 (65) - 
Number of years consecutively living in the village without migration/mobility  32.3 (169) - 
Note: number of respondents in parentheses 
 
4.2 Enterprising tendency in irrigation systems under collective action management 
Entrepreneurship is predominantly associated with individual’s activities, and is usually 
determined by diversities in objectives.  Diversities in objective of farmers influence 
preferences and adaptation of different strategies for livelihood sustenance by undertaking 
different entrepreneurial activities.  At the same time, entrepreneurship also possess the role 
of coordination of the firm/resource utilization by upholding institutions (law, morality, 
norm)  embedded in, like in the irrigation systems CA. Using 2SLS strategy to correct the 
endogeneity  in the model of farm household objectives and investment (annual expenditures) 
interdependence, this section presents empirical results to explain the effect of varying farm 
household objectives (commercial or subsistence) on investment enterprising tendencies in 
the irrigation systems under CA management. The summary statistics and definition of 
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Table 2: Definition and summary statistics for all variables used in the 2SLS regression 
Variable  Definition 
 
Unit measure mean Std 
loginv Annual own expenditures Tanzania shilling 
(currency)- logged 
12.6 1.3 
famobject Farm household objectives  Dummy-(1= commercial, 
0 =subsistence) 
0.82 0.38 
ownlandirrg Land ownership in irrigation command 
area  
 Dummy (1=yes, 0= no) 0.88 0.32 
gpleader Leadership governance  style in the group  Dummy- (1= good, 0= 
bad) 
0.65 0.47 
nontangible Non tangible benefits Dummye 1= information 
and external service 
access,0= none 
0.8 0.4 
trust Trust in group members and leadership Dummy(1=trust, 0= none) 0.95 0.19 
expirrig Experience in irrigation farming years 8.8 5.3 
contactcost Contact monetary costs Tanzania shillings 
(currency) 
9078.7 38482.6 
sex Sex of respondent(farmer) Dummy (1=male, 0 = 
female) 
0.80 0.39 
irrgreliability Irrigation physical  characteristics (water) 
reliability  
Dummy (1= reliable, 0= 
not reliable) 
0.72 0.44 
sacosaccess Sacos (financial service)  accessibility  Dummy (1= accessible, 0= 
not easily accessible) 
0.22 0.41 
rateirrh2o Rate of irrigation water distribution Category(=fairly good, 
2=satisfactory, 3= poor) 
1.69 0.65 
offarm Off farm activities engagement  Category (1= 
salaried,2=casual 
labour,3= small business 
4= non) 
3.09 1.78 
farmsucsuport Farm service support obtained Dummy( 1=yes, 0= none) 0.25 0.43 
quntityirrmarkt Output quantity marketed bags 100.5 358.15 
distancemarket Proximity/distance to the market km 5.59 7.42 
hhlabor Household member eligible for working on 
farm/labour force 
number 3.9 2.2 
soilirrgat Soil irrigation fertility level in the 
irrigation scheme 
Dummy (1= fertile, 0= not 
fertile) 
0.37 0.48 




The data contains missing values that were list wise deleted in a complete set analysis and 
only 38 sample size remained for the final analysis.  Before presenting the regression results, 
tests of validity of instruments and endogeneinety were performed to provide evidence of the 
choice of the model. The Durbin-Wu Hausman specification test results for endogeneity 
rejected the null hypothesis that farm household  objective variable (famobject) is exogenous 
and concludes that the variable famobject and investment (loginv) are all interdependent 
(endogenous), hence the use of 2SLS is appropriate in order to correct the endogeneity 
problem and establish the causality. The test results are presented in table 3. Empirical results 
from 2SLS regression indicate that overall, the instruments are jointly significant as indicated 
by the chi square value (p> 0.000 and R2 (Table 4).  
 
The variable farm household objectives (famobject)-a dummy variable measured as 1= 
commercial oriented, 0= subsistence oriented farmer was positive and significant at less than 
5% level.  The results suggest that farm household objectives, notably commercial oriented 
production promotes positively investment enterprising tendency in irrigation scheme under 
CA. That is, a one percent increase in commercial orientation for a farm household increases 
investment on own annual irrigation expenditures (enterprising tendency) by 210% than their 
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counterpart subsistence oriented farm households in a similar irrigation scheme. Thus, the 
empirical results show the importance of accounting for farm households’ objectives in 
promoting enterprising tendency in a CA setting and other collective entrepreneurship, such 
as any agricultural cooperative organizations. The implication is that commercial/market 
oriented farm households have an incentive to ensure coordination which is reflected in the 
positive investment made, as in the willingness to pay for services. These results are 
supported by other studies which indicated that the diversities in farmers’ objectives and 
livelihood strategies explained the observed differences in allocative and technical efficiency 
levels of farmers (Berkhout, 2009).  Further, these results point to the need, particularly in 
strengthening capacity of farmers on the aspects related to agri- business chains participation 
to enhance their capital investment for commercial oriented production objectives. This is 
important particularly in enhancing incentives for CA working in the irrigation scheme.  At 
the same time, however, farm household objectives tend to be influenced by other exogenous 
variables designated as “excluded instruments” such as output quantity marketed, output 
market distance, access to financial services /saccos (sacosaccess), off farm support services 
(off farm support), soil fertility status in the irrigation scheme land (soilirrgat), irrigation type 
-whether tradition improved or modern (irigtypedumy) and household labour force 
availability.  
 
The significance of endogeneity test (Table2) confirmed that the assumed exclude 
instruments are valid and correctly excluded from the equation, implying that the variables 
are relevant, positively and significantly influence enterprising tendency.   The included 
exogenous variables in the structural equation   like trust in group members and leadership 
(trust) was significant at 10% level, and positively influencing the investment (enterprising 
tendency). The variable trust result is also supported by other scholars e.g. Fafchamps (2002), 
pointing that trusting others enables economic agent to operate more efficiently, besides, it is 
essential for both economic exchange and public good delivery.  Fafchamps, (2012) also 
argues that trust can reduce transaction costs, encourage respect of contract, and facilitate 
cooperation. Thus, in this respect  a unit point of 1% increase in trust of farmers exerted to 
members and leaders in a group of CA in the irrigation scheme  supports/encourage 
investment enterprising tendency by increased own expenditures of  farm household  in the 
irrigation farming by 254%, and so increased coordination efficiency. Sex variable (sex) 
measured as 1= for male and 0= female, was positive and significant  at less than 5% level 
indicating that male farmers  support  increased investment expenditure  allocation in the 
irrigation farming under CA. In other words, being male farmer increases investment/ 
enterprising tendency by 148% own annual expenditures in irrigation farming for commercial 
oriented production than are female farmers, perhaps because of the cultural setting  usually 
adapted in the most Tanzanian households that male are the main decision maker in most of 
households.  
 
The variable experience in irrigation farming (expirrig) was significant at 10% level and 
negatively correlated to influencing investment enterprising tendency. A one point increase in 
experience reduces the investment enterprising tendency by 10.6%, implying that experience 
in irrigation farming does not matter in making investment venture decisions, perhaps 
because entrepreneurship venture is associated with judgmental decision under uncertainty 
over deployment of assets (Jos and Bart, 2008; Klein, 2009), hence these farmers had bad 
experience with the historical information regarding the firm / resource operating 
environment. The variable transaction cost   related to contact and information search cost in 
monetary value ( contact cost) was negative and significant at 1% level, suggesting that an 
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increase of one percent information search/contact cost reduces investment enterprising 
tendency. Though, the extent of reduction was not in a significant impact, had an implication 
on coordination incentives, particularly in the management organizations. These results are 
supported by other studies e.g. Casson,(1998) pointing that the instrumental importance of 
contact and information  is on coordination, hence an increase in contact cost is likely to 
reduce coordination incentives as  implied in the extent of  enterprising tendency.  Other 
variables, like ownership of land in the irrigation scheme command area (ownlandirrg) was 
negative and not significant, implying that farm household not owning and in the irrigation 
scheme command area had a disincentive in injecting capital investment and so do CA 
coordination. Group leadership style variable (gpleader) was negative and not significant. 
Though not significant, it had an implication that reduced/ disincentive of enterprising 
tendency favored farm households/farmers who considered the CA had bad group leadership 
style. The non tangible benefits (non tangible) such as aspects related to information sharing 
and use of CA as a bridge to access external support was not significant and negatively 
correlated to investment enterprising tendency. Although did not matter, the results imply that  
increasing existence of such attributes in the CA organization was a disincentive for 
enterprising tendency (i.e. reduced enterprising tendency), perhaps farmers have no 
information and knowledge regarding external support through CA organization, or had bad 
experience with support provided through collective action due to unequal benefit sharing. 
These results point to the need of strengthening and improvement of the negatively correlated 
variables to enhance incentives for enterprising tendency (Table 3).    
 
Table 3:  Summary of 2SLS regression estimated results 
Dependent variable: log(inv) 
Variable  coefficient SE Z value 
Famobject 2.10975 1.09 1.93** 
Sex 1.48664 0.63 2.35** 
Ownlandirrg -0.06924 0.91 -0.08 
Gpleader -0.19679 0.68 -0.29 
Nontangible -0.25378 0.34 -0.74 
Trust 2.54401 1.44 1.76*** 
Expirrig -0.10662 0.06 -1.91** 
Contactcost -0.00002 4.99 -4.65* 
Constant 8.58139 2.11 4.05* 
Endogeneity test: Durbin Wu Hausman specification test: 
Durbin (score) chi2 (1)= 11.5231 (P value =0.0007) 
Wu-Hausman F(1, 28) =12.186 (P value = 0.0016) 
Instrumented: Farm household objectives 
Excluded 
instruments: 
Irrgreliability, sacosaccess, rateh20, offarm, farmsacsuport, 
quantityirrmarkt, distancemarket, hhlaor,soilirrgat,irigtnypedumy, 
N=38 
Wald chi2 (8)=45.09 , Prob> chi2=0.0000, R2=0.4551 
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5.0 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This paper investigated the linkages between household farm objectives and enterprising 
tendencies for irrigation farmers to understand their incentives for CA coordination 
efficiency. The null hypothesis that household own investment (specific private own 
expenditures) decision in irrigation farming does not depend on farming objectives because 
irrigation is important for resource users in  enhancing  food and income regardless of the 
enterprising orientation the farmer took is rejected, which confirm the importance of taking 
into account the farm household objectives in promoting CA coordination.  The study 
concluded that farm household objectives, particularly commercial/market oriented 
production objective is an incentive for CA coordination efficiency in the irrigation systems, 
as is reflected in the level of enterprising tendencies (like the willingness to pay for the 
service) measured by investment value committed.  Other exogenous variables designated as 
“excluded instruments” which positively and significantly supported the farm household 
commercial/market oriented objective, such as output quantity marketed, market distance, 
access to financial services /saccos, off farm support services (off farm support), soil fertility 
status in the irrigation scheme land, irrigation type, and household labour force availability 
had the greatest support in policy prescription for CA coordination.  These variables have to 
be taken into account.  Other incentives were factors such as trust in group members and 
leadership, which was positive and significant in influencing enterprising tendency. Other 
factors such as absence of good group leadership style, lack of non tangible benefits like use 
of CA as a bridge for support services access and information sharing, lack of land ownership 
in the irrigation scheme command area, and increasing contact/communication cost such as 
travel or phone costs for the CA participation were disincentives for enterprising tendency, 
and so do coordination efficiency among farmers. 
The study recommends strengthening of advisory services in the irrigation schemes, 
particularly capacity building with regard to business development services (BDS) for 
commercial oriented farmers to enhance their investment and hence incentives for 
coordination efficiency of the CA. This can be through value chain development and 
formation of stronger sustainable partnership model that can effectively work out in bringing 
together different key actors and support service providers to enhance both tangible and non 
tangible support services, which their lack  were observed to be disincentives for coordination 
efficiency among farmers. The study further, recommends a comprehensive CA management 
training tailored particularly, into building trust among member farmers, which positively 
influenced enterprising tendency, and group leadership- which was a disincentive for 
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